Dans des études diachroniques et synchroniques récentes, on constate une convergence vers l’idée que l’analyse de des fonctionnant comme article (« article-like » des, désormais desal) ne doit pas être fondée sur une relation avec les partitifs. Cette contribution reprend ce débat et montrera que les approches proposées pour contourner une analyse partitive de desal entraînent pourtant un certain nombre de défis. L’identification de ces défis nous mène à élargir notre perspective vers les partitifs nus (c’est-à-dire des structures partitives sans (...) déterminant « upstairs », p. ex. de ces N) en français, italien et néerlandais. Surtout cette dernière langue est particulièrement intéressante, vu que les partitifs nus ne s’y sont pas fossilisés. Sur la base de ces données, nous proposerons une analyse de desal comme faisant partie de la famille des partitifs nus. Cette approche partitive de desa, qui rend compte de faits synchroniques et diachroniques, s’avère théoriquement plus élégante et a une couverture empirique plus large. (shrink)

The doctrine of simple individuals has its equal and opposite reaction in the view that an individual is simply a bundle of properties, that the identity of an individual is entirely dependent on the identity of its properties. This view also seems to me to be in some sense wrong and I shall attack it in passing. If all my remarks have seemed excessively polemical it is because I have been anxious to make it as clear as possible what the (...) motivation behind this paper is. I am mainly concerned with the problem concerning the "it" which underlies or has properties and I shall want to argue that the identity of an individual--what it is that makes an individual that individual--does not depend merely on its being that individual or having that piece of substratum, but it depends partially and in a complicated way on the identity of its properties. The analysis will have to exhibit the nature of that dependence. Most of the discussion will revolve around proper names and their function since it is through linguistic considerations, I think, that we get the clearest illumination. The result, in case any one is interested, will be Absolute Idealism, or something like it. (shrink)

We would like to thank an anonymous referee for his helpful comments on a previous version of this paper.

A multidisciplinary faculty committee designed a curriculum to shape biomedical graduate students into researchers with a high commitment to professionalism and social responsibility and to provide students with tools to navigate complex, rapidly evolving academic and societal environments with a strong ethical commitment. The curriculum used problem-based learning (PBL), because it is active and learner-centred and focuses on skill and process development. Two courses were developed: Scientific Professionalism: Scientific Integrity addressed discipline-specific and broad professional norms and obligations for the ethical (...) practice of science and responsible conduct of research (RCR). Scientific Professionalism: Bioethics and Social Responsibility focused on current ethical and bioethical issues within the scientific profession, and implications of research for society. Each small-group session examined case scenarios that included: (1) learning objectives for professional norms and obligations; (2) key ethical issues and philosophies within each topic area; (3) one or more of the RCR instructional areas; and (4) at least one type of moral reflection. Cases emphasised professional standards, obligations and underlying philosophies for the ethical practice of science, competing interests of stakeholders and oversight of science (internal and external). To our knowledge, this is the first use of a longitudinal, multi-semester PBL course to teach scientific integrity and professionalism. Both faculty and students endorsed the active learning approach for these topics, in contrast to a compliance-based approach that emphasises learning rules and regulations. (shrink)

Objective We conducted a process evaluation to (a) assess the effectiveness of a new problem-based learning curriculum designed to teach professionalism and scientific integrity to biomedical graduate students and (b) modify the course to enhance its relevance and effectiveness. The content presented realistic cases and issues in the practice of science, to promote skill development and to acculturate students to professional norms of science. Method We used 5-step Likert-scaled questions, open-ended questions, and interviews of students and facilitators to assess curricular (...) effectiveness. Results Both facilitators and students perceived course objectives were achieved. For example, respondents preferred active learning over lectures; both faculty and students perceived that the curriculum increased their understanding of norms, role obligations and responsibilities of professional scientists. They also reported an increased ability to identify ethical situations and felt that they had developed skills in moral reasoning and effective group work. Conclusions These data helped to improve course implementation and instructional material. For example, to correct a negative perception that this was an ‘ethics’ course, we redesigned case debriefing activities to reinforce learning objectives and important skills. We refined cases to be more engaging and relevant for students, and gave facilitators more specific training and resources for each case. The problem-based learning small group strategy can stimulate an environment whereby participants are more aware of ethical implications of science, and increase their socialisation and open communication about professional behaviour. (shrink)

Reports from antiquity — two factual and another based on myth — claim that Ptolemy I was a son of the Macedonian king Philip II. If so, Ptolemy was a half-brother of Alexander the Great. Scholars suppose that this rumour was promoted by Ptolemy I. But this cannot be confirmed. It seems rather that Arsinoë, the mother of Ptolemy I, was a concubine at the court of Philip II and that a rumour existed that Ptolemy I was illegitimately born. This (...) rumour developed in two separate ways. In Macedon, probably in the late 280's BCE, it was claimed that the father of Ptolemy was Philip II. The story may have been inspired by Ptolemy Keraunos in the course of his quest for the Macedonian throne. In Egypt, however, in spite of an apparent reluctance of Ptolemy I to link Lagos with his name, it was officially proclaimed in the reign of his son that Lagos was the father of Ptolemy I. It is possible thereby that Ptolemy II removed the stigma of bastardy from the first Ptolemaic king. (shrink)

We build on the work of Moore and Gino (2015) and of Rest (1983, 1986) to develop the Ethical Guardrails Model (EGM). The EGM shows students how personal behaviors, relationships, and habits can help them to avoid ethical mistakes in the workplace. The EGM illustrates the components of ethical business behavior, incorporates a new deliberative component, specifies five ways in which ethical behavior may become derailed, and describes practices that can help a person to avoid derailment. We also describe our (...) use of the EGM in the business ethics classroom, an experience that has changed our approach to teaching business ethics. (shrink)

A long needed book which will be widely welcomed and used. It is unique in its scope and in the sympathetic intelligence of its exposition. Twenty-eight philosophers from the anonymous redactor of the Book of Genesis to writers still living are represented. Each author is grouped with anywhere from one to four others under a common heading. Sherover has written about 165 pages altogether of introductory remarks to these eight groupings. The remarks are lucid, exhibiting his rare balance and flexibility (...) as both advocate for and critic of the authors, who are otherwise allowed to speak for themselves. His headings may disturb someone who has not confronted the author’s problem. Why, for example, should Whitehead be put under "The Analysis of Temporal Concepts" rather than "Time and Reality"? The answer is that the order of the chapters is historical, and the titles of the sections they fall under indicate a dominant type of philosophical approach when the given author was writing. I find this well done, having faced the problem in an incomplete manuscript which—thanks to the present work—I can now happily put aside. (shrink)

Despite the difficulties of establishing the meaning of "idealistic pragmatism," it is certainly a more descriptively accurate characterization of Josiah Royce’s philosophy than the more usual appellation of "absolute idealist." It suggests the American roots of his thought, and his relationships with Peirce and James, which are handled most sensitively in this book, though more briefly than the title might lead one to expect. The main object of the book is to establish the validity of the title, and in this (...) it largely succeeds. Certainly it is a useful endeavor, for Royce’s reputation as an Absolute Idealist has prevented his thought from becoming as widely known as it deserves to be, both for the clarity of his arguments for an idealist metaphysics and for his insights into the meaning of social life. Mahowald follows Oppenheim’s division of Royce’s thought into three periods, which he very carefully established. She then draws out the "pragmatic" aspects of the thought of each period, supplementing the main works with other published and unpublished material. The characteristic attitude of pragmatists is identified as "future orientation" and then Royce is included among them. (shrink)

The title is an allusion to the fact that, traditionally, propositions have served at least two distinct functions in philosophy, even though these functions have not usually been distinguished. Propositions have been invoked as the ‘meanings’ or ‘intensions’ of sentences and as the objects of propositional attitudes. Thus the proposition that Socrates is wise is the meaning of the English sentence, ‘Socrates is wise,’ and is what Charles believes when he believes that Socrates is wise. ‘Means that’ and ‘believes that’ (...) take the same kind of object. I shall argue, first, that there are two quite different functions here and it takes two quite different kinds of proposition to serve these distinct functions. The second thing I want to do is examine the suggestion that we can treat propositions as sets of possible worlds. There is a serious difficulty here, and so I shall want to turn that idea on its side: I shall define possible worlds as sets of G-propositions and then define E-propositions as sets of possible worlds. (shrink)

Chapter I announces the aim of the book, which is, to deal with the question: What is a language? It also registers complaints against current semantical methods. The sections here are closely related to Quine's Two Dogmas, but the author finds himself dissatisfied, not just with analyticity, but also with logical truth, truth, designation. The difficulties are of two orders. In one case they would be dissolved by having general definitions of the terms in question. In the other case we (...) should have to discuss use of a language and that would take us into pragmatics. It turns out that to get our "general" definitions we have to define "language," "logical truth," and "G-designation" all at once, so to speak. Chapter II lays down criteria of adequacy for a definition of "language": two languages are identical if and only if they have the same vocabulary and every expression has the same significance in one language as it has in the other. Now the author has to cope with "significance." In Chapter III, he follows Quine in holding that an extensional languages recognizes at most individuals, truth-values, and classes; and an intensional or modal language recognizes at most individual concepts, properties, and propositions. The author wants to have it both ways: like lots of people, he wants individuals and properties and propositions. To have it both ways, he has to work out a new semantical method ; and since his properties and propositions are not the familiar intensions, he has to call them G-properties and G-propositions. If these entities are named in the language then they are G-designated by their names. (shrink)